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State-City Revenue Sharing 
icy: Local Need versus 
System Explanations 
states have been thrust into a more pivotal role under the evolving 
Federalism." Reagan administration officials are pressuring the 
to develop the capacity and willingness to be effective partners in 
of new federalism, where the federal role is reduced and state 
local governments are the managers of their own problems. Specifi-
the reduction in federal aid for local governments demands that 
recognize the new, critical role of state assistance for urban areas 
communities, alike. Most local governments that experience a 
in federal aid in the 1980s will seek an increase in state aid, but 
be crucial for the neediest communities, those with socioeconomic 
' fiscal problems that will be most adversely affected by federal aid 
The compelling demand that states now face is to structure state 
to be responsive to community needs. 
provide both financial and programmatic assistance to local 
!rrunellts. The vast amount of state financial assistance is categorical 
with the largest allocations going to local governments for 
and public welfare. But since 1960, noncategorical aid-state 
Snimrl~--n2IS accounted for 8 to 10 percent of total intergovern-
eXJ)eI1ldit:url~s in the 50 states. Since state revenue sharing is 
to local governments for locally detennined purposes, it pres-
of the best mechanisms for aiding communities most severely 
by the loss of federal dollars. 
SHARING IN THE STATES 
extensive is revenue sharing in the states and how do states 
these funds? The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
'I 
I) 
, I 
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Relations (ACIR, 1980) reports that 49 states have established revenue 
sharing programs with their local governments, and that the~e ~nds. are 
distributed to local governments following four popular ~ntena. First, . 
returning money to the location of origin of the reve~ue IS used when : 
the state collects sales or income taxes that are locally Imposed and . 
returns these to the locality. Second, reimbursing local g?vernments 
property tax exemptions authorized by state statutes IS u~ed to 
tribute as much as 40 percent of state-local revenue sha~g 
1980:5). Third, in 1977, 30 states allocated all or part of their 
sharing money to local governments on a per capita basis 
7), which, while politically popular, does no! consider the difjren~nti.al 
needs of communities and their residents. Finally, states have 
implementing revenue sharing programs that factor-in the needs 
local government. Twenty-three states have needs-based systems 
hen, 1982:19), with need defined in terms of either local government 
capacity, tax effort, or social and economic need. . 
Revenue sharing has been the third largest category of state aid 
the 1970s, following only aid for education and welfa~e . In 1982 
spent over $10 billion on local government revenue shanng, o~ 10 
of total state aid. With most education and welfare funds gOing to 
units of local government, revenue sharing is, in many states, the 
important form of state aid for cities. It ha.s grown faster than any 
category of state intergovernmental spendmg over the past tw~ 
with a 1962-1982 growth rate 6f 1,100 percent.1 Just how effective 
states in targeting funds to those communities most. in need? 
search reported here analyzes state-city. revenue ~hanng over a 
period to determine the importance of aty .needs In the ~evenue 
receipts of large U.S. cities. In addition to aty need, a senes ~f 
factors are analyzed to assess their impact on revenue shanng. 
THE RESPONSIVENESS OF STATE AID TO CITIES . 
The number of studies examining the responsiveness of state 
cities has increased in recent years. Much of the research has 
either the total state financial aid program for cities or nT"~In'a1Tlll 
forms of assistance with most finding state aid to be re~ipons:ive 
aspect of community need. For exam~le, Dye an~. 
that states were responding to needs m central aties of 
politan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) and apparently did th~.better 
federal government. Teitelbaum and Simon (1979), wnting for 
tional Governors' Association, found states to be good tarl1:et:ers 
particularly when applying federal pass-through funds to 
critique of Dye and Hurley'S research, Ward (1981) argued that 
of per capita measures of state aid along ~ith percentage 
need may be misleading if such measures distort the actual 
State-Gty Revenue Sharing Policy 177 
betwee.n need a~d state or federal outlays. Ward's reanalysis using total 
state aid (unadjusted for population) and the actual size of the city 
population in need (e.g., total elderly, not proportion elderly) demon-
strated much stronger relationships between total aid and actual size of 
the need. . 
. Subsequent rese.arch into state-city aid programs has considered this 
Issue when analyzmg the targeting of state funds. For instance, Morgan 
and England (1984) used total measures of state aid to examine fiscal and 
programmatic assis~nce to cities. Analyzing state programs for cities 
over 50,000 population, they found city distress to be an important 
determinant of aid allocations from 1962 to 1977. Residual state aid to 
cities w~s exa~ned by Pelisse~o (1984). By regressing state aid on city 
~opulation, t~s rese~ch e.xamn:ed only the non population-based por-
tion. of .sta~e aid receipts m major U.S. cities. The results supported 
earlter findmgs that state aid was responsive to city needs and further 
demonstrated that states became better targeters over time. 
Rese~r~ ~n the rel~tive responsiveness of state revenue sharing pro-
IS hmlted. One Important study that has examined the effective-
of state formula and project grants to cities (Stein, 1981) found 
grants to be better targeted to social and fiscal need. One of the 
~".f'U'"<U'U'''> of these findings is that states with project-based revenue 
programs can target such funds to needier commnnities better 
with formula mechanisms, such as population-based programs. 
also noted that the conclusions in some of the above studies must 
'-<1L'UU'U"'lY interpreted, since each state has its own set of rules for 
He has shown that the observed responsiveness may 
very effective targeting of just a few states. 
the concerns raised above, it seems appropriate to consider, in 
to need, several state system factors that may affect th.e dis-
of state-city revenue sharing. Since state revenue sharing dis-
systems are somewhat varied (ACIR, 1980), certain states will 
be ~etter targeters to ~ocal need than others. One of the assump-
of this research, then, IS that states using a needs-based distribu-
system will be ·better targeters than states employing reimburse-
. population, or formula-based systems. 
broa~l~, state resources in general may be hypothesized to af-
poliaes for urban areas. Policy scholars have shown that a 
eco~omic r~sources are linked to policy outputs (see Dye, 1976); 
state mcome IS related to urban policies (LeMay, 1973); that state 
and industrialization are positive determinants of state finan-
programmatic aid to cities (Morgan and England, 1984); and that 
revenue efforts are often tied to the state's disposition toward 
local governments (Stonecash, 1981). Presumably, then, greater 
resources should be positively related to state-city revenue sharing. 
- \.; 
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A third consideration revolves around the legal "service provision" 
relationships between states and cities. States that have become more 
central providers of local services (Stephens and Olson, 1979) are also 
found to give less aid to local governments (Morgan and England, 1984). 
In addition, states have been shown to give larger aid amounts to cities 
with heavier financial burdens, those who fund education and 
services from the municipal budget (Morgan and England, 1984). 
ther research into state categorical aid to cities for welfare and eauc,an'Dn 
supports the proposition that state aid for these two functions is 
geted to cities with more educational or welfare responsibilities . 
issero, 1985). However, the direct link to revenue sharing is less likely 
be significant. In fact, we may assume at this point t~at cities ~th 
functional responsibilities for education or welfare Will not recelve . 
amounts of revenue sharing, since the state may have already 
sated them for these services through categorical aid programs. 
might even argue that such cities will receive less revenue sharing 
ey, since they receive more than average aid in the education and 
fare areas, making their total state aid larger than cities without 
functional responsibilities. 
This chapter. attempts to extend the state aid responsiveness 
by focusing on state revenue sharing programs. Given that 
stated criterion in at least 23 state revenue sharing programs, 
appropriate to analyze how well targeted are revenue shari~g 
large cities. The importance of state resources, revenue sharmg 
tion systems, and municipal government service obligations will 
examined to see if local need or state system factors are fhe more 
tant determinants of state-city revenue sharing policy. 
DATA AND METHODS 
This chapter attempts to answer the general research 
state-city revenue sharing targeted to the neediest cities? . 
questions include: Have states become better targeters of 
ing funds over time? Have particular dimensions of city 
influential in state revenue sharing allocations than others? 
level factors more important determinants of state revenue 
cities? To answer these questions, data have been collected . 
largest cities in the states. This sample includes all cities that 
populations of 300,000 or more (but not cities that achieved ·· 
population later than 1970.)2 These large cities were chosen · 
pIe because the most serious problems that came to be 
the urban crisis were and still are found among this 
reason, one would expect state governments to be 
acquainted with the problems and distress in these 
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awarene~s could provide the opportunity for targeting state-city reve-
nue sharmg to these city governments. 
Th~ analysis of ~tat~-city revenue sharing covers three time periods. ~.~ fi~t 17ar studied IS 1962,a period before the awakening to an urban 
cn~lS m t IS country, and one which also witnessed little in terms of an 
active r~le ~or states in. urban affairs. Consequently, one would not 
expect slg~fica~t targeting of state-city revenue sharing to have oc-
curred .durmg this time. The secon~ time point is 1976, or 15 years later. 
~ollowmg the peak of the urban cnsis and the predominant federal role 
m urban pr.oblem-solving, this period was chosen to reflect the evolving 
state capaClty and willl'ngnes t 'd b s 0 al ur an areas. Here one expects to 
see somewhat b~tter targeting of state revenue sharing to needier cities 
because state legIslatures have been reapportioned; adding more urban 
. many states have established state-level departments of ur-
.a.ffarrs, ~d both the federal-local grant developments and the crisis 
cI~es ~urmg the previ~us decade forced states to take a more active 
m Clty problem-solvmg. The final time period is 1982 and w 
to assess targeting. practices at the start of a more state-center~ 
!der., llism era. The expectation is that state responsiveness to city needs 
be most ~ronounced 20 years after the first period analyzed. Also, of 
here IS the de~ree ?f tarl?e~g taking place two years after Presi-
began signaling his mtent to increase state responsibility 
problems. 
. dependent variable is state revenue sharing receipts of sample 
~ each of the three years, derived from Census Bureau reports 3 
mclude data by city on intergovernmental revenue received fro~ 
gove~nm:nts ~or "general support." Among the sample cities, rev-
sharmg lS a slZable component of total state aid for local govern-
T~~ average revenue sharing fund in the states in which the 47 
Clties a:e located and ~e prop~rtion of total state intergovern-
expendltures for three times pomts are indicated below: 
$ 26 million 
$181 million 
$305 million 
(7.7% of total state aid) 
(10.1 % of total state aid) 
(10% of total state aid) 
is size of st~te reve~ue sharing important, but so is its growth 
vU'''' ..... :Ll •• While state mtergovernmental spending increased 800 
from 1962 to 1982, revenue sharing grew by over 1,072 percent-
growth rate than any functional category of state aid. 
of state revenue sharing is often allocated on the basis of 
't"ua'''Ulil. a ,Pattern typi~al of much intergovernmental aid (see 
and M~ler, 1984; Pehssero, 1984), total revenue sharing re-
each City was regressed on population to produce a non-
!! 
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population-determined measure of revenue sharing. Removing pop~a­
tion from the dependent variable should not be interpreted as rem?vmg 
the primary or sole basis for distributing the funds, however. Fift~en 
states among those in which tl:te sample cities are !~cated use popul.atio.n 
as a factor in allocating state revenue sharing to CIties. But populatio~ lS 
the dominant factor in the allocation process of only seven cases. lhe 
rest of the cities receive revenue sharing with population as only one 
among as many as six factors weighed in the cru:tribution process. The . 
new nonpopulation based residual re,:enue shanng m~as?re~ for 1962,: . 
1976 and 1982 allow for analysis of thiS form of state aid m light of diff~ential needs of the sample cities. In other words, with PCIP.l: u.' amJn~ 
based factors removed from the measure, one can begin to exarrune 
much state revenue sharing was allocated on a needs basis and 
much according to state-level influences. . 
Since the focus of this study is upon city need, the mdependent 
abIes used here represent one of three dimensions of need or . 
communities. There is difficulty in defining exactly what constitutes 
need-a problem noted by the AOR (1980) in its. own work o~ 
revenue sharing with local governments. Need will be treated 10 
study similar to its use in previous analyses of intergo,:ernmental 
responsiveness (Cuciti, 1978; Dye and Hurley, 1978; Stem, 1981). 
is, three dimensions of city need are included among the 
variables: sOcial need, economic need, and fiscal need .. The three 
tors of social need, taken from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 cenSl,lses, 
clude: (1) elderly (total population 65 years or older), (2) poverty 
families below the poverty threshold), and (3) crime rate (total 
crimes reported). Since each measure is also highlr correlated (r > " 
with population, each was regressed on p~pulation t? prodl,lce . 
sidual measure of social need. Two econorruc need vanables . 
derived from the above three censuses. City population growth 
measure of population change in the cities f~r 1950-.60,. 
1970-80. Home ownership, the other economic need mdicator, 
sured by total owner-occupied housing during each period.4 
two measures of the financial health of city governments have 
included. The first of these is city budget deficit or the UUJ"::«"'''' 
tween city revenues and spending in 1%2, 1976, and 1982. The 
measure is fiscal effort in the same three years, measured as 
between general revenue and total personal income in th~. city 
If state revenue sharing money is targeted to needy cI~es, 
sidual revenue sharing will be positively related to the SO~lal 
fiscal need measures and inversely related to the economic 
sures. The expectation is that targeting did not ?ccur in 1962, 
fore the relationships should be weak or opposite 9f the 
tion. On the other hand, residual revenue sharing in 1976 
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~pected.to show stronger evidence of targeting, which would be con-
slStent With research on aggregate state aid to cities (Dye and Hurley 
1978; Morgan and England, 1984; Pelissero, 1984). ' 
Because w,e are confronted with 50 separate and distinct state aid syste~s (Stem, 1981), a series of indicators will be employed in the 
analyslS that measure state differences. First, a dummy variable has 
been cr~ated fo~ ea~h o~ the three years that indicates whether or not the p~edommant cnterlon m a state's allocation system is municipal need. ~mce states use as many as six criteria in the revenue sharing distribu-
tion system, state~ that use local need as the major factor have been code~ 1, all others are coded 0.6 This variable will serve as a state-level p~e~cto~ that is most directly related to each state's revenue sharing 
distribution system. The assumption here is that state use of a needs-
based alloca~on system will be positively linked with more residual 
reven:ue shanng. To assess state resources, measures of both state tax 
capaCIty and ta~ effort will be included in the analysis. 7 We can assume 
th.at states m~g greater .tax efforts and states with greater tax capacity 
will als? prOVide more reSIdual revenue sharing funds to cities. Finally, 
th.e asslgnme~t of m.a~or state service responsibilities at the local level 
will be exa~ed. CItIes have been coded according to whether they edu~ation or w,elfare ser~ices ~ough municipal financing, both 
sefVlces, or nelt~er servIce. This measure is labeled "functional 
(Liebert, 1974). Because functional comprehen-
has been linked in the ~terat~ to both total state aid (Morgan 
England: 19~) and categonca~ aId ~or education and welfare (Pel-
1985) ~ CI~es: ~e expect this varIable to be negatively related to 
shanng m CIties. 
YSIS OF RESIDUAL REVENUE SHARING, 1962-1982 
NlIllnPle. regression models were developed for residual revenue shar-
. City need for each time-point. The initial models included all 
mdepende.nt variables measuring need and are displayed in table 
. The regre~slOn for 1962 showed no significant effects for any of the 
need vanables. Th~ ~~tiple correlation (R) of .44 suggests that 
19 percent ~f the varIability In 1962 residual revenue sharing can be 
. . for Wl.th ~ese need predictors. And although the model is statistic~lly Significant, the analysis is consistent with the expecta-
. that reSidual revenue sharing would not be well targeted in this first 
of the 1976 regression in table 12.1 suggest that some c~anges may have occurred since 1962. Three of the seven dlsp~y stronger and significant standardized regression co-
(Beta) In 1976 than in 1%2. This suggests that state revenue 
. , . 
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Table 12.1 Multiple Regression Models for Residual State-City Revenue 
Sharing and City Need, 1962-1982 
1962 1976 1982 
P'redictorl Coefficient 
.179 . 221 .354 
Elder l y lluidual 
. 179 .235 . 354 ' I.ta 
.946 3.021" 1. 792 t-ratio 
. 175 .016 - . 043 
povel'ty Residual b 
.175 .017 -.043 
•• ta 
. 991 .195 - . 286 t-n.do 
- . 022 - .085 .178 
Crime R.esidual b 
-.022 -.085 .178 Bata 
- . 135 -1.040 1 . 388 t-ratiO 
- . 022 . 004 
Growth Rate b 
-.118 .036 leta 
- . 513 . 485 t-ratio 
-.000 -.OOC 
HOtM Ownersh i p b 
- . 693 -.992 J.ta 
-.276 -10.094" t-ratio 
-.000 . 000 
Budget Deficit. 
-.284 1.109 leta 
-1.642 10. 330· t-J'atio 
4,656 - . 733 
riaea l Effot:t b 
. 252 -.060 Bet. 
1.153 - .778 t-t:atio 
(Intet:ee'Pd 
- . 273 . 930 
. 44 . 93 
!2 . 19 .87 
, 1.13 3S . 88" 
(N) (42) (47) 
.'P ~ . 05 . 
S
haring was more targeted to need in this year than it had been '.' 
. . t cities with more 
with more revenue shanng gomg o. . ., this 
homeowners and larger deficits. What 1S surpnsmg m . " 
among the n~ed variables that were not significant p~dictorsd 
. hi between revenue sharing and fiscal effort, cnme, an 
:::el further away from a pattern of targetin~ fOv:;aU, .. 
variable model produced an R= .93 and ~ccounte or '. 
variability in 1976 residual revenue sharmg. . . 
. I d l' t ble 12 1 is the seven-variable regreSSIon Thefinamo ema . dl 
In general, the 1982 analysis shows this to be a p~o:.er mo e 
revenue sharing than that for 1976. ~lthoug .1ve .. 
stronger determinants in 1982, several dIsplayed Slgn , 
mnz-::-
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three social need measures had higher Betas in i982 than in either 1962 
or 1976, but none was significant. And while the pattern of targeting to 
cities with more elderly and higher crime rates improved, there was a 
slight drop in the already weak targeting on poverty. Homeownership 
was the only significant predictor in this year, "and its standardized 
regression coefficient was smaller (-.37) than in 1976 also. The most 
divergent changes occurred among the fiscal need predictors where rev-
enue sharing seemed to improve its targeting to cities making stronger 
fiscal efforts while also being less responsive to deficits. Although nei-
ther variable is significant, this pattern is very similar to the finding for 
1962. Overall, this seven-variable model accounts for 49 percent of the 
variability in residual revenue sharing-a significant drop from 1976. At 
the same time, the significant predictors in both 1976 and 1982 were 
those showing better targeting to need. ' 
The next step in the analysis was to assess the importance of the four 
state-level measures. A first examination of the intercorrelations among 
these state-level variables demonstrated that aU four could not be in-
cluded in a multivariate model. Specifically, this was due to the high 
correlation between state tax effort and revenue sharing distribution 
system variables. In each year there was a strong positive relationship 
between the two measures, showing that states making strong tax 
efforts also tend to be states that distribute revenue sharing funds on a 
local government needs-basis.8 Such a relationship is significant in itself 
, and suggests that states with better tax efforts are also more likely to 
, consider local government needs. The tax effort variable will be dropped 
in the succeeding analysis, though, to permit us to employ the revenue 
sharing distribution measure in the multivariate model. 
Similar to the analysis performed with the predictors of city need, the 
0;,.''' ... , ..... 1> three state system variables were employed in a multivariate 
Table 12.2 displays one multiple regression analysis for each of 
time points. It is clear that in i962 none of these predictors was 
significant determinant of residual revenue sharing in the sample cit- , 
The 1976 model is significant and warrants some discussion. The 
statistically significant predictor was the revenue sharing distribu-
system measure (Beta = .29). This positive relationship indicates that 
residual revenue sharing was somewhat determined by use of a 
'eals-o,ase,a allocation system in the states. The coefficient demon-
improvement over the 1962 model and reflects the wider use 
neE~ds'-balsed allocation systems by the mid-1970s. Although not sig-
predictors, both state tax capacity and functional comprehen-
displayed somewhat surprising relationships to revenue shar-
Contrary to the expectations, residual revenue sharing was larger 
cities that carried a heavier municipal burden for local education 
welfare services and whose states had smaller tax capacity. 
1;'¥2.'it ---
184 Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy 
Table 12.2 Multiple Regression Models for Residual State-City Revenue 
Sharing and State System Measures, 1962-1982 
Predictou Coefficient 1962 1976 1982, 
Distribution Syac •• . 133 .681 1.240 
Beta . 040 .288 . 517 
c-ratio . 215 2.09- 4.41-
State Tax Capacity -.001 - . 024 - . 001 
Beta -.165 - . 212 - . 2l0 
t-ratio ' -1.02 -1.54 -1. 79 
Functional eQUIp .124 .277 -.260 
B.ta .111 . 250 -.365 
t-ratio . 627 1.84 -3 . 12-
(Intercept) a .910 2.16 .900 
!2 
. 24 .49 .66 
.06 .24 .43 
1 .72 4.35- 10.57-
(N) (42) (47) (47) 
*p < .05. 
The 1982 analysis suggests the best model for residual revenue 
ing. By that year, two of the predictors-the distribution system 
functional comprehensiveness-were significant. As 
larger revenue sharing receipts in the sample cities were found 
cities had fewer functional responsibilities and the state used a 
based distribution system. Again, state tax capacity was negatively 
ed to revenue sharing. This three-variable model explains 43 , 
the variation in the cities' residual revenue sharing receipts, better ' 
either 1962 or 1976. The final time-point analysis also suggests a 
about in this form of aid. No longer was more revenue sharing 
cities that had more education and welfare services supported 
municipal treasury. As expected, this may indicate that states 
revenue sharing to cities already receiving more total state aid 
of the categorical assistance for these functions.) Finally, the 
the 21-year period is a positive one, with states making 
changes in the revenue sharing distribution system that 
stronger relationship with city need,. , 
The final stage in the analysis is to examine the effects of both 
need and state system variables on residual revenue sharing. 
parsimonious set of predictors, including just two city need 
were chosen for this stage in the analysis. One is a mf"astJTe 
cioeconoriric need in cities--elderly. This variable was oo:sitivelv. 
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lated with revenue sharing in e ch f 
measure of de enden' a o. the three years and is a good 
to income and pover cy ~he populati?n due to its strong relationship 
budget deficit. It appe~s to ~ second dClty need var~able to be used is 
and it was highly correlated ~~£o~o measure of ~scal need in cities, 
home ownership was not included' me ~wnership .. For th!s reason w~ largely be represented by deficit~n~e /:al an?lysls, but Its effects 
mIt property tax exemptions for elder1 ). e er1y (smce most states per-
Table 12.3 shows the final lti I Y . 
bination ,of city need and t mu p e regr~sslOn models using the com-
again that for 1962. The ~~te :rst~~ vanables: The weakest model is 
negatively related to residual ~ve~l~~nt. pre~ct~r, ~udget deficit, is 
nue was not well targeted in th t anng-mdlcatmg that the reve-
revenue sharing was not ve a ye~. So as expected, state residual 
crisis period. The changes l!:~~~s~ve1~ need during this preurban 
targeting on the part of the st t F m 76 generally. suggest better 
positive relationship between ~ue;g' etO~ e£~~t pled' there IS the ~xpected 
e ICl an revenue shanng and, 
R
Final Multiple. RegreSSion Models for Residual State-City 
evenue Sharrng, 1962-1982 
Predictor. Coefficient: 1962 1976 1982 
Budget De~icit 
-.000 
Beta .000 -.000 
-.325 
t-ratio 
-2 . 09-
. 256 
-.054 
1.83 
-.475 
Elderly B. .. idual 
. 122 
. 401 
. 384 Beta 
. 122 
t-ratio . 427 .383 
. 751 3 . 25_ 3.03-
Distribut i on Sy.te1Zl 
.373 
. 000 
. 995 Beta 
.112 
t-ratio . 256 .415, 
. 608 1.83 3.74-
State Tax Capacity 
- . 001 
Beta -.001 - .000 
-.152 
t-ratio -.080 - .072 
- . 952 
-.624 
- . 633 
Functional Comp b 
. 056 
Beta .080 - . 200 
. 053 
t-ratio .072 - . 283 
. 284 
. 544 
- 2.57'" (Intercept) 
. 816 
.802 
. 260 
:2 . 41 .68 
.75 
.17 
.47 
.56 P 1.42 7.00- 10.06-
(N) (42) (47) (47) 
-p i .05. 
, " 
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also, elderly and revenue sharing. Along with the positive effects ~f the 
distribution formula, there is clear evidence that states were do~g a 
much better job of responding to city need by that year. Th~ predictors 
representing city need are obviously more important ~etennIn~nts than 
the state system variables in this year; together the five predictors. ac-
count for 47 percent of the variability in 1976 residual revenue shanng . . 
The importance of the state system variables is much more apparent 
in the final model, that for 1982. Although elderly was sill! a . str~ng . 
predictor, the strongest detenninant in that ye~r was th.e distribution 
formula. Again in this year we can note that hi.g~er r~sldual revenue 
sharing monies were found among sample aties With greater so-
cioeconomic need, fewer education and welfare burdens on the .•.. 
pal budget, and where states emphasized city n~ed in the 
system for revenue sharing. Together, these vanabl~s a~count for 
percent of the variability in residual revenue shanng In 1 
strongest of the three models. 
CONCLUSION 
Local governments are turning to the states, expecting their 
government to pick· up some of the sl~ck left by the federal 
meni's reduced role in local problem solVIng. A clear colnrrlimneIlt 
need will be evident in the allocation of state aid monies to local 
ments throughout the remainder. of this decade. On~ of the 
tions for state aid, and one that will be most wel~ome m COlnrrlurliti4~S" 
more extensive use of state-local revenue sharmg. A strong 
can be made that these funds will be more effective if they are 
to needier communities. The pattern of targeting that has oc(::tll'Irea 
residual revenue sharing for cities from 1962 to 1982 suggests that 
have demonstrated that they can respond to urban needs. 
For instance, the data for 1962 indicate that state-city ~evenue 
was not targeted to needy cities. But the change occur.nng by 
erally supports the hypothesis that state revenue s~~g would 
ter targeted following the peak of the urban cnsls and 
ing/reapportionment in state gove~ents .. State re~enue ~ .. , .... ~."' 
shown to be responsive to all three dimenSions-sOCIal, ea>n()m:ic/ i 
fiscaI--of city need in this period. One could rea~onably 
change to such factors as the i~creased stat~ capaaty and willlingtlE 
play a more prominent role m urban affa1r5, the example set 
federal government through direct federal-local aid progr~s, as 
the initial movement toward a more state-centered federahsm 
gan during the Nixon administration. More recently, the 
1982 reveals that although residual revenue sharing ~oe~ not 
be as responsive to need as it was in 1976, there 15 still 
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targeting in the 1980s. Yet it seems plausible that states did not actually 
alter t?eir me~hod of !~ge~g b:!ween 1976 and 1982. Rather, by 1982 
changmg socal conditions In aties, such as the growing number of e~derly and po~r elderly and the increase in reported crime, may have 
gtven these soaal need variables more importance than other need fac-
tors. At the same time, the revenue sharing aid mechanism may have 
become more popular for those large cities that wanted to avoid the 
additional "grantsmanship" often needed to secure categorical funds. 
And more states had included local need as a factor in the revenue 
sharing distribution syste,?: The ease of receiving state revenue sharing 
funds may have aIlowed abes to rely upon these funds in lieu of seeking 
new forms of categorical aid. 
In sum, city need is an apparent and important factor in state-city r:ven~e sha~g~particularly in the mid-1970s. State system explana-ti?n~ In~rease In ~portance over time such that the revenue sharing 
distnbution system IS the most important determinant of residual reve-
nue sharing by the early 1980s. We should note that 1982 was only the 
fIrst yea~ that any New Federalism initiatives were in place. The pattern 
of targeting obse~ed am?ng sample citie.s in 1982 may be continuing 
and perhaps even ImprOVIng as we move mto the middle of the decade 
and states become more settled with the latest version of state-centered 
federalism. A~ a minimum, the evidence indicating that the state role in 
revenue sharmg has been a positive one since the mid-1970s should 
provide local government officials with a positive outlook on state re-
sponsiveness for the foreseeable future. And, if states continue the 
trend toward wider employment of local government need as a criterion 
the revenue sharing a!location process, this type of state aid may 
the most responsive form of assistance for cities in need. 
1. Information was calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census State Gavenl-
Finances in (year) for 1962, 1976, and 1982, (Washington, D.C.; Government 
Office, 1963, 1977, 1983). 
More exactly, the list is the 47 largest U.S. cities in 1970 exclusive of Wash-
D.C., which, of course, receives no state aid. . 
for the state revenue sharing variables are taken from Table 7 in U.S. 
the Census, City Government Fillances in (year), for 1962, 1975-76, and 
(Washington, D.C. ; Government Printing Office, 1963, 1977, 1983). 
Data for the social and economic need variables were taken from the 1960, 
and 1980 Censuses of Population and Housing. 
Data for the fiscal need variables were taken from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 
of Population, and City Government Finances in (year) for 1962, 1975-76, 1981-82, Table 7. 
The basis for distributing revenue sharing is found in U.S. Bureau of the 
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Census, Census of Governments, 1962 (and 1~~,. 1~2)'o~:~ ~~me;~;;01~~ 
Governments (Washington, DA~o;;;=:of ;;;te a~d Local Fiscal Capacity and 
7. Data were taken from '. i States (1983). 
Tax Effort (1962); ~nd 1981 Tax Capa~ty:! t;: F(1~2) .56'(1976), .61 (1982). 
8. The correlations are as follows. r . , 
REFERENCES 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. 1980'
t 
~~~~e State-·. 
Local Revenue Sharing (Washington, D.C.: Governmen, g" 
Neal M. 1982. "Community Assistance: The States Challenge, 
Cohen, . 8' 14-21 
tergovernmental ::J":!:eth J. M~ier. 1984. "Pass the Biscu~ts, 
Copeland, Gary. W., ., Mak' g and Federal Grants," Amerrcan Congressional DeclSlon- m 
OIIarterly, 12: 3-21. F dIG t 
.. P 1978 City Need and the Responsiveness of e era ran 
CUClti, eggy.· f R resentatives Committee on 
Report to the U.S. House 0 ep . th Cty 95th Congress, 
Finance, and Utban Affairs, Subcomrmttee o~ . e I , . . 
Session (Washington, D.C.: Gove~me~t Pnnti~g O~lce): of 
Dye, Thomas R. 1976. Policy Analysis (UniVerSity, Ala .. University . . 
Press). I 1978 "The Responsiveness of . 
Dye, Thomas R., and Thomas 1. HUurb~ Probiems " Journal of Politics 40: 
and State Governments to r , 
20~ h I 1973 "Expenditure and Nonexpenditure M:~sures of 
leMay Urba: ~olicy ~tput: A Research Note," American pohtrcs 
511-28. . Str ture and EJq:>eI1lditul 
. d J 1974 "Municipal Functions, uc , LlebertR!~::;'SiS 'of Re~ent Resea~hgla'" S~i~9~~;;t~a~~lro ~~ties: A 
Morgan, David R., and Robert E. n n. . 
Inquiry" Publius 14: 67-82. . . f 
. h' P 1984 "State Aid and City Needs: An Exammation 0 . pelisse~~~!: A~d ~o La;ge Cities," Journal ?f Politi:~ 46: 916-935i sis of • 1985 "Welfare and Education Aid to Cities: An Ana y 
-_.: N d "Social Science Quarterly 66: 444-52. . 
sponslveness to ee s, ti f State Aid' A Comparison of 
Stein Robert M. 1981. "The Targe ng 0 . 
, Delivery Systeln5," The Urban Interest 3: 47-59. TIt ' h Federal . 
d G raid W Olson. 1979. Pass- roug . Stephe~:ter~~~~:~ in t~ American Federal System, 1957-1977, •..• 
National Science Foundation (August 1). . rce • 
St h Jeffrey M 1981 "State policies Regardmg Local Resou onecas , " . Ad' tm nt or Coherent 
tion: Disorder, Compensatory IUS e , 
A ican Politics Quarterly 9: 401-25. . 
Teitelba::: Fred and Alice E. Simon. 1979. Bypassing the,States: Wrong . 
Urba~ Aid '(Washington, O.c.: National Governors . 
W d P te D 1981. "The Measurement of Federal and State 
ar ' U~b:n Problems," Journal of Politics 43: 83-101. . 
13 
Incremental and Abrupt 
Change in Fiscal Centralization 
in the American States, 1957-
1983 
Jeffrey M. Stonecash 
Change has been a fundamental part of state-local fiscal relations in the 
United States. Over the last 30 years states have assumed an increasing 
role in fiscal matters. States now raise a larger proportion of all revenue 
raised by states and their localities. States also provide a larger propor-
tion of direct services, and local governments are more reliant than ever 
on state aid as a source of their revenue (Stonecash, 1983, 1985). 
. While change has occurred, how it occurs is not clear. Is it incremental 
with making marginal adjustments that nonetheless produce 
SlgrutlCrutlt cumulative change? Lindblom (1959) suggested that most 
UUIJLVllldlJ<.JJllo! is characterized by incrementalism. Beer (1973) argued 
the specific area of centralization the primary driving force is 
change in the structure of the economy. This fits well with the 
rV1lITm'nr of Dye (1966) that economic forces are primary in affecting 
policies. If broad and gradual changes in society and the economy 
important, then our explanatory focus might be on how political 
absorb and respond to gradual change. 
however, argue that change is just as likely to be abrupt. 
reanalysis of Key's (1949) hypothesis about the "organization" 
groups supports this view. He found that changes in state 
were abrupt and products of different coalitions gaining control 
rnv,,'rnrrIPnt (1977, 1979). Wirt (1983:307) and Due (1963:4) argue, 
the Ovil War and the Great Depression were sources 
IlgJliti.callt changes in fiscal responsibilities of state governments. 
(1983:149) finds a clear burst of state tax adoptions during the 
From this perspective our theories and methods must be devel-
.. \ 
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